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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By 
Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra’s doctrine 
of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which 
the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub 
this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the “problem of 
essence”. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist 
phenomenology because: (1) Yogācārins, especially later Yogācārins represented by Xuan 
Zang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; (2) 
Husserl’s phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal 
sense (Sinn) that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate 
Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional 
acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism. 
 
Keywords: essence, emptiness, later Yogācāra, transcendental idealism, Buddhist 
phenomenology  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Ideas1, Husserl defines phenomenology as the science of essence, not the science 
of matters of facts (Hua 3/5). This demarcation marks his turn from descriptive 
phenomenology (the study that factually analyzes real psychological phenomena) to 
transcendental phenomenology (the theory that explains essential ideal conditions that 
make real psychological phenomena possible). Regardless of this turn, Husserl uses 
phenomenology as the approach to consciousness. He describes human consciousness 
to be the intentional awareness constituted by subjects in their interaction with objects 
that appear as mental phenomena. Here, then, goes Husserl’s slogan: consciousness is 
the consciousness of something for someone.  
  This conception of consciousness in Husserl permits, at least in principle, the 
possibility of comparative studies between Husserl’s phenomenology and Yogācāra 
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Buddhism. Characterized by its doctrine of vijñāptimātra (Consciousness-only), 
Yogācāra Buddhism (henceforth Yogācāra) has been a major Mahāyāna Buddhist 
school since 300s CE. According to the Chinese Yogācārin Xuan Zang (Hsüan-tsang,
玄奘, 602CE- 664CE), Yogācārins conceive of consciousness as “vijñāpti (liao-bie,了
别)” (T31N1585, P1a29). This Sanskrit term ‘vijñāpti’ literally means the act that 
causes someone to know something distinctly (Hall 1986, 8).  
 Many scholars remark that Yogācāra’s definition of consciousness is very close 
to Husserl’s, not just from the phenomenological tradition (Iso Kern, Ni Liangkang, 
Zhang Qingxiong, etc.) but also from the Buddhist one (Lin Chen-kuo, Yao Zhihua, 
Dan Lusthaus, Dan Arnold etc.). Phenomenologists depict consciousness as that of 
something for someone and Yogācārins demarcate consciousness as that which lets 
someone to know something. For both, consciousness correlates subjective acts of 
knowing with objects to be known. 
For instance, Dan Arnold defines consciousness through intentionality or 
“aboutness”. By aboutness, Arnold means that consciousness is always about certain 
objects (Arnold 2012, 7). According to Arnold, both modern philosophers of mind, 
including Husserl and Yogācārins such as Dharmakīrti in 600s CE endorse the 
intentional account of consciousness. Refusing to enclose consciousness in the mind, 
Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela argue that consciousness is what we enact in 
our bodily experience (Thompson and Varela 1991, xvi). Since this embodied 
account of consciousness is not fully developed in the West, Thompson and Varela 
turn to Madhyamaka Buddhism (henceforth Madhyamaka), a doctrine that is non-
western but more practical. Iso Kern and Ni Liangkang find it not enough to define 
consciousness on the descriptive level, be it aboutness or embodiment. To 
complement the definition, Kern and Ni inquire into conditions that make these 
intentional acts possible on the interpretive level. Now that both Husserl and 
Yogācārins demarcate consciousness on these two levels, Kern is convinced of the 
“universality” of Husserl’s phenomenology (Kern 2012, 154). Following Kern, Ni 
articulates the two-level as a “twofold structure”1: intentionality on the surface and 
subjective ideality deep down (Ni 2010, 81-84). Under this conception of 
consciousness, Ni puts forward his comparative project called “Consciousness-only 
phenomenology” that infuses textual analysis in Yogācāra with Husserl’s factual 
analysis (Ni 2010, 81-86). 
                                                
1  Ni argues that “although Yogācāra Buddhism does not directly adopt any concept similar to 
‘intentionality’ in Phenomenology in the analysis of consciousness, it still shares many common points 
with Phenomenology”, among which Ni enumerates five similarities: enacting reflection or 
introspection in the analysis of consciousness; deconstructing the subject-object dichotomy; adopting 
reduction as the method; advocating the twofold structure of consciousness, twofold as the surface-
structure and the deep-structure; recognizing the relation between objectivating and non-objectivating 
or between the founding and the founded acts (Ni 2010, 81-84). In the meantime, Ni also clarifies the 
differences between Yogācāra and Husserl: 1) Yogācāra philosophy contains more practical, more 
moral elements than Husserl’s Phenomenology; 2) due to its religiosity, Yogācāra accounts for 
consciousness in the hope of justifying Buddhist faith whereas Husserl’s phenomenology is a rigorous 
science; 3) after explicating the constitution of consciousness, Yogācāra proceeds to negating 
subjectivity, a step that is not advanced by Husserl (Ni 2010, 84-86). 
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Most comparative scholars expect their studies to open dialogues between the 
East and the West. Under this expectation, they treat, consciously or unconsciously, 
Husserl’s phenomenology and Yogācāra philosophy as two separate entities. Notably, 
Dan Lusthaus disputes this dualistic approach in his Buddhist Phenomenology 2 
(Lusthaus 2003, vi). As Lusthaus claims, he does not want to pose a dichotomy 
between Yogācāra on the one hand and phenomenology on the other (Lusthaus 2003, 
vi). Rather, he translates Yogācāra Buddhism to a transcendental phenomenology in 
the Husserlian sense (Lusthaus 2003, viii). This translation is referred to by Lusthaus 
as ‘Buddhist Phenomenology’ the mission of which is to bridge gaps between eastern 
and western cultures (Lusthaus 2003, vii).  
Regardless of his fruitful findings, I find Lusthaus’s project vulnerable to one 
meta-epistemological 3  problem that has been discerned by many comparative 
scholars cited above. Arnold contrasts Dharmakīrti’s “epistemic idealism” with the 
“cognitive-scientific physicalism” in modern philosophy of mind4 (Arnold 2012, 11-
17). Thompson and Varela suspend discussions as such insofar as they do not intend 
to establish a unified mind-body theory (Thompson and Varela 1991, xviii). Ni also 
eschews contradictions between Husserl and Yogācāra by orienting his 
Consciousness-only phenomenology towards epistemology.  
I dub this meta-epistemological problem the ‘problem of essence’. Buddhist 
philosophy rejects any type of essentialism, due to Buddha’s teaching of emptiness. 
According to this teaching, all objects, be it the world or the human self, do not have 
permanent essence. To the contrary, Husserl formulates his phenomenology as the 
science of essence that stresses the importance of subjectivity. Given these two 
different attitudes towards essence, how can we advocate such a Buddhist 
phenomenology both as a science of essence and as an anti-essentialistic philosophy 
of religion? Or, how can we justify the compatibility between the phenomenological 
essence and Buddha’s teaching of emptiness?  
Most comparative scholars evade this problem by focusing on the epistemological 
side of Yogācāra and phenomenology. In this way, they can remain neutral towards 
meta-epistemological issues. Yet, if we follow Lusthaus, we must confront the 
problem of essence so as to defend Buddhist phenomenology against it. I plan to 
                                                
2 To contrast Lusthaus’s ‘Buddhist Phenomenology’, I do not put ‘phenomenology’ in its upper case in 
my articulation of ‘Buddhist phenomenology’.  
3  By ‘meta-epistemological’, I mean any metaphysical and ontological presuppositions prior to 
epistemology. I deliberately avoid the term ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ for two reasons. First, many 
Buddhist scholars doubt whether we can directly transport these western philosophical terms into 
Buddhism because ‘ontology’ or ‘metaphysics’ carries substantial meaning and this meaning 
contradicts Buddha’s teaching of emptiness (Xia 2002, 133-139; Fu 2002, 15-27). Second, in the 
Husserlian scholarship, a term as “ontological” or “metaphysical” also becomes problematic because 
Husserlians are still debating over Husserl’s attitude to metaphysics. I will come back to this debate in 
section three. 
4 Arnold worries that Dharmakīrti (as an anti-physicalist and an idealist) is vulnerable to his own 
critique of physicalism. Arnold’s main argument is that: since Dharmakīrti affirms the function of 
causal laws, he shares partly the worldview of physicalists; then, how could Dharmakīrti validly 
critique physicalists when his view does not differ too much from the latter? (Arnold 2012, 47).  
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resolve this problem by demarcating the sense in which Yogācāra’s5  account of 
emptiness, with particular focus on that in Xuan Zang, countenances the Husserlian 
essence.   
On the Buddhist side, I contend that later Yogācārins, unlike Mādhyamikas and 
early Yogācārins, advocate a positive view of the existent because they attribute 
nominal existence to illusory dharmas and real existence, though not in a substantial 
sense, to consciousnesses. By this positive articulation, they remedy the problematic 
accounts of emptiness in Madhyamaka and early Yogācāra. On the phenomenological 
side, Husserl formulates essence as the ideal meaning or sense (Sinn) that ensures 
objectivity of mental phenomena in subjective consciousness, not as any a-spatio-
temporal substance. Since Yogācāra’s emptiness is not a void and the Husserlian 
essence is not a substance, we can resolve the problem of essence. Subsequently, I re-
articulater Yogācāra Buddhism as a transcendental phenomenology in the Husserlian 
sense: epistemologically it enriches Husserl’s account of intentional consciousness 
and meta-epistemologically it conforms to Husserl’s transcendental idealism6.  
To tackle the problem of essence, I also expose my paper to many controversies. 
The first controversy concerns the Orientalistic7 romanticization of religions: scholars 
                                                
5 Since half of my paper is about Yogācāra, I want to carefully define this term. Yogācāra, as most 
Buddhist schools, accommodates various sectarian differences, far from being a school of 
homogeneous views. Keeping in mind these sectarian differences, I highlight the distinction between 
early Yogācāra (wei-shi-jin-xue, 唯識今學) and later Yogācāra (wei-shi-gu-xue, 唯識古學), a topic I 
will come back to in section two. In particular, I show that it is not early Yogācāra but later Yogācāra 
that eventually resolves inconsistencies in Madhyamaka’s account of emptiness. Besides, I do not 
think it is possible for me to advocate an overall compatibility between Buddhism and Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Here, I have put aside anther doctrinal debate among Buddhists on whether 
Yogācārins embrace essentialism and thus violate Buddha’s teaching of emptiness.   
6 I will elaborate the meaning of transcendental idealism later in section three. Here, I want to highlight 
the difference between early Yogācārins and later Yogācārins on their respective meta-epistemological 
positions. Scholars are still debating on the way in which we can properly demarcate Yogācāra’s 
idealism. Lambert Schmithausen interprets it as a metaphysical idealism – “there are no entities, 
especially no material entities, apart from consciousness, or more precisely, apart from the various 
kinds of mind (citta) and mental factors or mind-associates (caitta)” (Schmithausen 2005, 1). Ashok 
Kumar Chatterjee considers it as an absolute idealism so that Yogācāra can surpass Madhyamaka’s 
dialectical idealism (Chatterjee 1962, 27-28). Alex Wayman casts doubt on Chatterjee’s reading of 
“consciousness as the sole reality” because the idealism in Yogācāra is as such “in respect to content, 
this system is realistic; in respect to form, it is idealistic” (Wayman 1965, 67). Thomas Kochumuttom 
prefers to dub it ‘realistic pluralism’, not ‘monistic idealism’ (Kochunuttom 1982, 21). Dan Lusthaus 
portrays it as transcendental idealism. Most scholars acknowledge Yogācāra’s critique of metaphysical 
realism. Before advocating my own interpretation, I want to point out one factor that causes the 
perplexity of Yogācāra’s idealism, that is, Yogācārins offer at least two meta-epistemological theories. 
As I shall show in the conclusion, while early Yogācāra embraces metaphysical idealism, later 
Yogācāra advocates transcendental idealism. Due to this contrast, I would be hesitated to bring 
Yogācāra’s idealism under one brand. Besides, Lusthaus did not give a clear definition of 
transcendental idealism. Due to the unclarity, Lusthaus’s interpretation of Yogācāra has been defied by 
scholars like Schmithausen. 
7 I use the term Orientalistic, not Orientalist because I intend to accommodate two different but related 
vantage points. One is Orientalism that posits the duality between the rational West and the non-
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usually posit a dichotomy between the non-rational East and the rational West in 
intercultural dialogues. While remaining neutral to this dichotomy, I agree on Robert 
Sharf’s critique that by romanticizing, scholars over-homogenize eastern and western 
thoughts (Sharf 1993, 43).  
The second issue is referred to as the “cult of nothingness” by Roger-Pol Droit, 
that is, scholars often inappropriately simplify Buddha’s teaching of emptiness to a 
negation of the world and the self (Droit 2003, 22-23). Doctrinally, however, as I will 
show in this paper, Buddhists develop much more complicated accounts of emptiness 
than a “cult of nothingness”. Not just do Yogācārins disagree with Mādhyamikas, 
even inside the Yogācāra School, early Yogācārins and later Yogācārins have debated 
on the demarcation of emptiness.  
Amid the third controversy, scholars question Chinese Buddhism’s authenticity. 
Many of them regard Chinese Buddhism as an inauthentic sinicization of Indian 
Buddhism (Ch’en 1973, 5; Zürcher 2007, 4).While not engaging with this issue of 
authenticity, I support Lin’s view that the Chinese scholarship on Yogācāra has long 
been ignored but these resources will contribute to contemporary studies on Yogācāra 
(Lin 1999, 231-247).  
 
2. EMPTINESS IN MADHYAMAKA AND YOGĀCĀRA 
 
In this section, I elucidate Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness by contextualizing 
his thought in the historical development from Madhyamaka to Yogācāra. Here, I 
rework Xuan Zang’s narrative to show that Mādhyamikas bring many inconsistencies 
in their view of emptiness that are resolved not by early Yogācārins but by later 
Yogācārins. For this reason, Xuan Zang elevates later Yogācārins’ explication of 
emptiness as the optimal. 
Xuan Zang advocates this narrative in his sūtra classification framework (pan-
jiao, 判教): the Buddha preaches Hīnayāna dharmas on the four noble truths that 
prepare audience for Madhyamaka’s secretive saying on “all dharmas are empty”, but 
the Buddha finalizes the preaching with Yogācāra’s “direct explicating of three-
nature and the principle of non-empty suchness”8 (T45N1866, P481a14-20). Buddhist 
                                                                                                                                      
rational East. The other is the reversed Orientalism that appropriates the Orientalist duality but reverses 
it to argue for the superiority of non-rational East over rational West.   
8 Fazang writes in the Paragraphs on the Doctrine of Difference and Identity of the One Vehicle of 
Huayan  (Huayan-yi-cheng-jiao-fen-qi-zhang, 華嚴一乘教分齊章 ) that “the tenth way [of sūtra 
classification] comes from Xuan Zang, the Tang Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master. Following the 
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Suvarṇaprabhāsottamarājasūtra, and the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, he 
classifies [Buddha’s teachings into] three canons, namely, the three dharma-wheels. The Buddha 
turned the dharma-wheel for the first time in the deer-garden when the Buddha preached on the four 
noble truths. This preaching is about the dharmas of Hīnayāna. The Buddha then illuminated the 
dharma-wheel for the second time in the Mahāyāna tradition when the Buddha secretively said that ‘all 
dharmas are empty’ etc. The Buddha held the dharma-wheel for the third time inside the Mahāyāna 
tradition when the Buddha directly explicated the three-nature and the principle of non-empty suchness 
etc. (十依大唐三藏玄奘法師。依解深密經金光明經及瑜伽論。立三種教。即三法輪是也。一轉
法輪。謂於初時鹿野園中。轉四諦法輪。即小乘法。二名照法輪。謂中時於大乘內密意說言諸
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clergy in China use pan-jiao to organize sūtras translated in various periods, in the 
hope of managing discrepancies within these theories. Xuan Zang, in his pan-jiao, 
accounts for the discrepancy between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra like this – 
Madhyamaka’s secretive saying (mi-yi-shuo, 密意說) is in consistency, not in rupture, 
with Yogācāra’s direct explicating (liao-yi-shuo, 了意說) if we understand Yogācāra’ 
explication as an amelioration of Madhyamaka’s9. 
At the beginning of Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (cheng-wei-shi-lun, 成 唯 識 論 , 
henceforth Siddhi) Xuan Zang alludes to this narrative through the two reasons for 
Yogācārins to preach on emptiness: (1) clearing the wrong views of conceiving the 
self and the world as the svabhāva; (2) promoting the correct view of Consciousness-
only. By these two reasons, Xuan Zang confirms the therapeutic goal of Buddhism – 
emptiness cures suffering. Moreover, for Xuan Zang, compared with later 
Yogācārins’ articulation (for whom, both the self and objects are illusions constantly 
transformed by consciousness), other readings of emptiness10, such as those from 
                                                                                                                                      
法空等。三名持法輪。謂於後時於大乘中顯了意說三性及真如不空理等)” (T45N1866, P481a14-
20). According to Tang Yongtong, Fazang used to assist Xuan Zang with sūtras translations in Ci’en 
Temple but resigned due to their different understandings on Buddha’s teachings (Tang 2000, 174). 
We can infer that Fazang was very familiar with Xuan Zang’s preaching so that Fazang’s record can be 
trustworthy. 
9 Many verses in the Siddhi support Fazang’s record. We locate one of them in the section on the three-
non-nature (triniḥsvabhāvatā). Here, Xuan Zang poses the question: “if there are three natures, why 
the World Honored preaches that ‘all dharmas are not svabhāva’ (若有三性。如何世尊說一切法皆
無自性) (T31N1585, P47c24)”. Xuan Zang answers that this saying from the Buddha is articulated 
only in the secretive way, not in the explicit manner. Explicitly, it is not that all dharmas do not have 
any nature – dhamas do have certain nature, albeit this nature is not the own nature qua svabhāva 
(T31N1585, P48a5-6).  
10For the translation of Xuan Zang’s Siddhi, I have consulted Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s French 
translation and Francis H. Cook’s English translation. At the beginning of the Siddhi, Xuan Zang 
writes about the purposes of Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā. The first purpose is “for those who 
do not fully comprehend（mi, 迷, vipratipanna）or wrongly understand（miu, 謬, apratipanna）the 
two empties (二空，pudgalaśūnyatā, dharmaśūnyatā) to acquire correct comprehensions. The correct 
comprehensions are for the detachment from two strong hindrances (āvaraṇa). The two hindrances are 
generated by the two attachments (ātmangrāha, dharmagrāha). If the two empties are realized, the 
hindrances will be detached (今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故。由我法
執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷) (T31N1585, P1a9-10). The second purpose is “for those, who 
wrongly attach to the permanent self (ātman) and to permanent objects (dharma) and for those who do 
not fully understand Consciousness-only (vijñāptimātra), to realize the two empties and to truly know 
the meaning of Consciousness-only (又為開示謬執我法迷唯識者。令達二空。於唯識理如實知故) 
(T31N1585, P1a13-14)”. The last purpose is “for those who do not fully comprehend or wrongly 
understand the meaning of Consciousness-only. Those people either consider external objects 
(bāhyārtha) as consciousness which are not inexistent; or regard inner consciousness as external 
objects which are not existent; or consider that all consciousnesses derive from one original 
consciousness, albeit these various consciousnesses have respective functions; or regard mental factors 
without citta to be the non-existent. Vasubandhu intends to refute these diverse wrong conceptions in 
order to promote the true understanding of the profound and wondrous meaning of Consciousness-only 
(復有迷謬唯識理者。或執外境如識非無。或執內識如境非有。或執諸識用別體同。或執離心無
別心所。為遮此等種種異執。令於唯識深妙理中得如實解故作斯論)（T31N1585，P1a14-18)”. 
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Sarvāstivādins (for whom, external world has real existence), from Mādhyamikas (for 
whom, inner consciousness does not exist at all), and from early Yogācārins (for 
whom, there is an original consciousness that serves as the condition for all dharmas), 
are just not-so-correct (T31N1585, P1a13-18).  
By focusing on the conception of emptiness, I re-articulate Xuan Zang’s narrative 
as follows: Hīnayānas do not understand emptiness as the negation both of the 
permanent self and of the permanent world; Mādhyamikas attain the correct 
understanding of emptiness but their secretive saying contains inconsistencies; early 
Yogācārins do not fully distance themselves from Mādhyamikas so that they fail to 
resolve these inconsistencies; only later Yogācārins ameliorate Mādhyamikas’ 
secretive saying by their direct explicating. For this reason, Xuan Zang elevates later 
Yogācārins’ interpretation of emptiness to the most ideal.  
Now, let us revisit the account of emptiness in Madhyamaka, its advance from 
Hīnayāna, and its problems. This negative approach to emptiness unfolds primarily in 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (zhong-lun,中論, henceforth MMK). Nāgārjuna 
contests the opposition between emptiness and dependent co-arising by portraying co-
arising as “neither arising nor perishing; neither permanent nor terminate; neither 
identical nor different; neither coming nor going” 11  (T30N1564, P1b14-15). A 
portrait as such alludes to Nāgārjuna’s middle way – emptiness is neither identical 
with nor different from illusions. By illusions, I do not mean wrong perceptions. Nor 
do I use illusion to translate a specific Buddhist term. Rather, I consider illusions as 
dharmas that dependently co-arise, seeming to be permanently real12. For Nāgārjuna, 
emptiness sublates dualistic views between being/arising and non-being/perishing. 
                                                                                                                                      
As per Vallée Poussin, these three purposes are articulated respectively by Sthiramati, Citrabhānu, and 
Dharmapāla in their interpretations of Vasubandhu (Vallée Poussin 1928, 3-5). In light of Vallée 
Poussin’s explanation, I conclude two goals for Vasubandhu to preach on Consciousness-only: 
clearing the wrong view of conceiving self and objects as svabhāva (as in the first purpose) and 
clarifying the correct view of Consciousness-only (as in the second and third purposes). Those who 
could not correctly understand the doctrine of Consciousness-only are ordinary people, senika heresy 
(as in the second purpose), and clergy from other Buddhist schools (as in the last purpose). These 
Buddhist schools are Sarvāstivāda (external objects or the bāhyārtha have real existence as 
consciousness), Madhyamaka (inner consciousness, as external objects, do not exist), early Yogācāra 
(all consciousnesses derive from one original consciousness). 
11 For the translation of the MMK, I mainly consult the Chinese translation from Kumārajīva and the 
English translation from Siderits and Katsura. The Chinese translation is “不生亦不滅, 不常亦不斷,
不一亦不異,不來亦不出” MMK 1:1-2 (T30N1564, P1b14-15). Siderits and Katsura translate directly 
from Sanskrit that “neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the eternal, neither 
singularity nor plurality, neither the coming nor the going” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 13). However, I 
conjecture that regarding the characteristics of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda), it is more 
suitable to translate them as adjectives, not nouns. Plus, I revise Siderits and Katsura’s translation of 
the third pair of neither-nor into neither identical nor different insofar as it alludes to the identity of 
dharmas – as per Piṅgala, “if they are all identical, it is impossible to have cause and effect in the same 
way that if they are all different, they can not succeed one after another (若一則無緣。若異則無相續
)” (T30N1564, P2a4-5).  
12 Given this definition of illusion, I interchangeably use ‘illusion’, ‘illusory dharma’, and ‘illusory 
image’. 
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This portrait might make little sense for common people. Mādhyamikas will find this 
confusion quite normal because our common sense entails only the conventional truth 
(saṃvṛtisatya) about illusory dharmas. Eventually, we sublate common sense for the 
ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) in which we know emptiness as neither being nor 
non-being.  
  However, how is one to discern emptiness if emptiness becomes ineffable on the 
ultimate level? When scholars try to articulate the ineffability of emptiness, they fall 
into debate. In the Madhyamaka scholarship 13 , we can enumerate at least four 
explications of Nāgārjuna’s emptiness. First, absolutists construe emptiness as the 
ultimate reality or the absolute noumena. All co-arising dharmas derive from the 
absolute noumena so that dharmas are relative phenomena (Murti 1955, 251). Truths 
about these relative dharmas are conventional. Since the conventional truth expresses 
nothing about the absolute reality, this truth becomes a “courtesy” (Murti 1955, 252). 
Eventually, for the ultimate truth of the absolute, this courtesy is to be ‘sacrificed’. 
Some scholars attack the first reading for their substantializing of emptiness. For 
these scholars, emptiness is not an absolute reality but a pure void (Narain 1964, 316-
318). Since these scholars read emptiness as a negation of any possible existence, 
their reading is branded nihilism (Yao 2010, 85). For nihilists, although we can speak 
of emptiness (śūnyatā) on the conventional level, ultimately emptiness is ineffable 
(Narain 1964, 336). Now that the ultimate truth of emptiness transcends languages 
and thinking, Nāgārjuna also embraces epistemic skepticism. This becomes the third 
or the skeptic reading—emptiness in Nāgārjuna nullifies concepts. After negating the 
conventional truth, we acquire a more objective view called the ultimate truth (Ganeri 
2001, 43-47). In this understanding, skeptics allocate the ultimate truth in a logical 
order higher than the conventional one. Instead of giving another positive definition, 
anti-realists in the fourth reading define emptiness as the method of disputing 
Ābhidharmic realism –what we hold to be true on the conventional level is merely 
conceptually constructed; eventually, “we cannot give content to the metaphysical 
realist’s notion of a mind-independent reality” (Siderits 1988, 321-324). Therefore, 
emptiness is the way of rejecting viewing reality as mind-independent. 
If the secretive saying or the negative approach shows the gist of Nāgārjuna’s 
MMK, I conjecture that Nāgārjuna would find the fourth reading, a reading that is 
articulated negatively, more plausible. Let me explain first why the first three 
readings are not fully correct. If emptiness were a pure void and negated any 
existence, then nothing would exist and thus nothing could arise or perish. Contra the 
nihilistic reading and the skeptic reading, Nāgārjuna argues that emptiness is not a 
pure negation. Otherwise, emptiness could not be identical with the dependent co-
arising14. Nor would the four noble truths hold true15. Yet, on the other hand, if 
                                                
13 Here, I am indebted to our reading group on the MMK organized by Dr. Antoine Panaïoti. He listed 
the four readings in the handouts for the first session of our reading group. We can also infer these four 
readings from his book Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy (Panaïoti 2013, 18). In order to facilitate 
the unfolding of my argument, I re-organize the order of the four readings.   
14 As Nāgārjuna says in MMK 25:1-3, “if all dharmas were empty, there would be neither arising nor 
perishing. [If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is nirvāṇa that is called (若一切法空，
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emptiness were an ultimate reality, this reality could not accommodate any changes. 
Likewise it could not permit arising and perishing. Contra the absolutist reading, 
Nāgārjuna depicts no absolute reality underneath all dependent arising dharmas16.  
As Nāgārjuna says, “the dependent co-arising, we declare [it] to be emptiness. It 
is also a dependent concept; just that is the middle way”17 (T30N1564，P33b11-12). 
We see emptiness as such in the middle of an absolute nothingness and an ultimate 
reality – it is a non-duality of duality (a dichotomy advocated by absolutists between 
relative dharmas and absolute reality) and non-duality (the negation of the relative-
absolute duality)18. Thus, Sengrui remarks that the term ‘middle’ reveals the gist of 
the MMK19.    
Then, why the fourth reading is more plausible? As we have seen, by means of 
the middle way, Mādhyamikas depart from Hīnayāna teachings, a departure that 
advances Buddhist philosophy to another level. As Gadjin Nagao identifies, 
Madhyamaka elevates the conception of emptiness to the core of Buddhism through 
its radical critique of Hīnayāna realism as well as any metaphysical theories that are 
oriented with the dualistic view of being and non-being – nirvāṇa is no longer a 
higher reality or the antidote to saṃsāra because nirvāṇa neither affirmas nor negates 
saṃsāra (Nagao 1991, 213-214). Since Nāgārjuna uses emptiness to refute any 
dualistic views, he shall object to both metaphysical realism and idealism.   
Although Nāgārjuna invalidates dualistic doctrines by his articulation of 
emptiness, he fails to make his arguments consistent. First, he renders the nature of 
co-arising dharmas on the conventional level ambivalent. If emptiness is identical to 
co-arising dharmas, how could dharmas be empty at the moment they co-arise? (Yao 
2014, 320-321). Second, he makes the ultimate truth impossible for us to know. If 
there is an ultimate truth of emptiness as such, we would know it (Burton 1999, 4-5). 
Yet, how can we know an object qua emptiness when we cannot assume this object to 
                                                                                                                                      
無生無滅者，何斷何所滅,而稱為涅槃)? (T30N1564, P34c15-16) If all dharmas were not empty, 
there would be neither arising nor perishing. [If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is 
nirvāṇa that is called (若諸法不空，則無生無滅，何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃) ? (T30N1564, 
P34c21-22) Neither acquired nor abandoned, neither terminate nor permanent, neither arising nor 
perishing; thus is nirvāṇa to be called (無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃)（
T30N1564, P34c26-27)”. 
15 Nāgārjuna says in MMK 24:1 that “if all dharmas were empty, there would be neither arising nor 
perishing. [If so,] how could the four noble truths exist (若一切皆空，無生亦無滅，如是則無有，
四聖諦之法)?” (T30N1564,P32b13-14). 
16 Nāgārjuna says in MMK 24:19 that “there is no one single dharma that does not arise because of 
dependent co-arising. Thus, among all dharmas, there is no one that is not empty (未曾有一法，不從
因緣生，是故一切法，無不是空者)”（T30N1564，P33b13-14). 
17 MMK 24：18眾因緣生法，我說即是無。亦為是假名，亦是中道義. 
18 Here, I borrow the terminology of “nonduality of duality and nonduality” from Victor Hori. In his 
discussion of Kenshō, Hori uses this terminology to indicate that Kenshō or satori is not merely a 
negation of dualistic thinking because this negation per se is still dualistic (Hori 2000, 285).  
19 Sengrui writes, “MMK has five hundred verses, composed by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. The title of the 
book is ‘middle’ that has already illuminated its content (中論有五百偈。龍樹菩薩之所造也以中為
名者。照其實也)” (T30N1564, P1a6-7). 
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exist? The third problem is that of logical infinite regress. If the ultimate truth is the 
truth of a higher order because we acquire the ultimate truth by sublating the 
conventional truth, then we can continue to sublate this ultimate truth by another 
higher truth, so on ad infinitum. Given these problems, we do not know if Nāgārjuna 
really fails to define emptiness consistently or if he is using these inconsistencies to 
convince us of reason’s limitation (Hayes 1989, 159; 166).  
For Xuan Zang, it is not fully correct for us to articulate emptiness in a negative 
way. Rather, the secretive saying shall prepare us for the positive articulation of 
emptiness. Dharmas are empty because they are transformed by the underlying 
consciousness, not because this consciousness and its transformations have no 
existence. If we negate the existence of consciousness and its transformations, as per 
Xuan Zang (as well as Yao), we render ambivalent the nature of conventional truth. 
That is why the Buddhas deem anyone who conflates emptiness with the pure void to 
be incurable20.  
On the basis of Mādhyamikas’ implicit teachings, Yogācārins refashion the 
conception of emptiness by affirming the existence of consciousness. Gadjin Nagao 
depicts this positive approach to emptiness as Yogācārins’ insight of “absolute 
emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214). Fairly, Nagao conceives of the 
development from Madhyamaka’s negative saying to Yogācāra’s positive explicating 
as the maturation from Madhyamaka’s “awareness of emptiness” to Yogācāra’s 
conception of “absolute emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214). 
Historically, however, it is a gradual process for Yogācāra to emerge out of and to 
eventually depart from Madhyamaka. In the transitional phase, as I shall show, 
although early Yogācārins accounted for emptiness as wondrous being, they failed to 
resolve Madhyamaka’s inconsistencies. Because of their failure, Xuan Zang also 
categorizes early Yogācārins’ teachings as ‘not-so-correct readings of emptiness’.  
Indian Buddhists portray the divide inside Yogācāra as such: early Yogācārins 
negate the existence of illusory images/dharmas but later Yogācārins affirm it. For 
this reason, they dub early Yogācāra nirākāravijñānavāda (Consciousness-only 
without illusory images) in contrast to later Yogācāra, the sākāravijñānavāda 
                                                
20  Xuan Zang responds to the third objection to vijñānaptimātra that “‘Yet, regarding this 
vijñānaptimātra, is it not empty? If not, why?’ Because it is not to be grasped or attached. It is so 
because by emptiness of dharma, we mean that dharmas, which are transformed by consciousness and 
are falsely grasped as real, are unattainable in principle. We say emptiness of dharma not because 
vijñānaptimātra, which is ineffable but can be realized by correct wisdom, does not exist. If 
consciousness as such does not exist, the conventional truth does not exist either. The inexistence of 
the conventional truth results in the inexistence of the ultimate truth. It is so because the conventional 
and the ultimate are interdependent. People who negate the twofold truth misunderstand emptiness. 
They are considered as incurable by the Buddhas. Thus, we shall know that all dharmas are empty and 
also not empty (此唯識性豈不亦空。不爾。如何。非所執故。謂依識變妄執實法理不可得說為
法空。非無離言正智所證唯識性故說為法空。此識若無便無俗諦。俗諦無故真諦亦無。真俗相
依而建立故。撥無二諦是惡取空。諸佛說為不可治者。應知諸法有空不空 )” (T31N1585, 
P39b14-19). 
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(Consciousness-only with illusory images)21 . Yao delineates a genealogy of this 
division as follows (Yao 2005, 122),  
 
      Nirākāravijñānavādin—Asaṅga—Vasubandhu—Sthiramati—Paramārtha and Bodhiruci 
Sākāravijñānavādin—Dignāga—Dharmapāla – Dharmakīrti—Xuan Zang and Kuiji 
 
      Let me now clarify the point earlier that early Yogācāra fails to fully distance 
itself from Madhyamaka. For early Yogācārins (such as Sthiramati and Nanda), all 
dharmas, all consciousnesses, all mental factors are transformed from one original 
consciousness so that all transformed illusions are false, characterized by the subject-
object duality22. Since illusions originate from the original consciousness, they have 
consciousness as their nature. Then, if consciousness has the same nature as illusions, 
it can not be ultimately real. That is why in the Sūtrālamkārakārikā, Asaṅga preaches, 
“nothing exists outside the citta; things do not exist, neither does the citta” 23 
(T31N1604, P599a19). Asaṅga compares illusions to the light projected by the citta 
or by consciousness. Since the citta has the same nature as the light, if the light does 
not exist, the source of the light qua the citta does not exist either.  
We shall raise our attention to early Yogācāra’s phraseology in their articulation 
of emptiness. For early Yogācārins, illusions derive from consciousness so that they 
have consciousness as their nature. Since illusions are empty, so is consciousness. 
This wording is very similar to what Nāgārjuna advocates in the MMK –dharmas 
dependently co-arise from emptiness as dependent concepts; they are also emptiness; 
just that is the middle way.  
Like Mādhyamikas, early Yogācārins also confront the same question: if illusions 
have consciousness as their nature and both do not exist, how could this 
                                                
21 Lü Cheng elaborates further on the distinction in this way: for early Yogācāra, Consciousness-only 
means that “both the grasping subjects (i.e. the seeing parts, jian-fen, 見分, darśanabhāga,) and the 
objects being grasped (i.e. the seen parts, xiang-fen, 相分, nimittbhāga) have consciousness as their 
nature and both are falsely posited (古學所言唯識，無論能取所取皆是識性，皆是虛妄分別)” (Lü 
1968, 75). For later Yogācāra, however, Consciousness-only means that “grasping subjects and 
grasped objects can have different natures but they still depend on consciousness(皆為所緣可別有性
，但不離識故名唯識)” (Lü 1968, 76).  
22  Xuan Zang writes “some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc. are transformed by 
consciousness but these transformations are not as real as consciousness in the dependent nature. 
Otherwise, the doctrine of Consciousness-only could not be justified because in this case, 
consciousness and external objects would have real existence (然相分等依識變現。非如識性依他中
實。不爾唯識理應不成。許識內境俱實有故)” (T31N1585, P59a6-7). As Vallée Poussin comments, 
for Xuan Zang, the first view comes from Nanda (Vallée Poussin 1928, 714). The last view is from 
Sthiramati, “some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc. have consciousness as their nature 
because consciousness transforms itself by force of perfuming as if consciousness encompassed these 
(seeing and seen) parts. Suchness is also the real nature of consciousness. Thus, nothing exists outside 
the nature of consciousness. The term consciousness (here) also covers the accompanied mental factors 
because these factors always associate with consciousness (或相分等皆識為性。由熏習力似多分生
。真如亦是識之實性。故除識性無別有法。此中識言亦說心所。心與心所定相應故 )” 
(T31N1585, P59a15-17).  
23 Asaṅga writes, “心外無有物，物無心亦無” (T31N1604, P599a19). 
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transformation from consciousness to illusions happen in the first place? In early 
Yogācāra, the nature of illusory dharmas is still ambivalent because early Yogācārins 
do not affirm any existence of illusions. Due to their inability to remedy the 
ambivalence of illusions but also due to their negative demarcation of consciousness 
and illusions, early Yogācārins do not distance themselves from Mādhyamikas (Mei 
2014, 345). Moreover, if illusions have consciousness as their nature, is 
consciousness another illusion or the underlying emptiness? To answer this question, 
early Yogācārins in China split into to sects. Daśabhūmika (di-lun-pai, 地论派 ) 
represented by Bodhiruci contends that among all eight consciousnesses, ālaya is half 
illusory half empty whereas Saṃgraha (she-lun-pai, 摄 论 派 ) represented by 
Paramārtha postulates emptiness as the ninth ādāna consciousness outside all eight 
consciousnesses. Xuan Zang was determined to study Yogācāra in India because he 
wanted to bridge gaps between Daśabhūmika and Saṃgraha. 
Contrary to early Yogācārins who conceive of illusions as illusory light without 
any existence, Xuan Zang describes illusions transformed by consciousness to be 
“seemingly real as consciousness”24 (T31N1585, P59a8). By seeming reality (xu-shi, 
虛實), Xuan Zang means that illusions, despite being empty of svabhāva, still have a 
special way of existing. Otherwise, we could not explicate the nature of illusions at 
the exact moment they arise. Xuan Zang quotes the Madhyāntavibhāga that “the 
imagined (parikalpita) does not really exist. In order to indicate its non-real-
existence, we metaphorically say it as names”25 (T31N1585, P47a10). As per Xuan 
Zang, these seemingly real illusions have nominal existence (jiayou, 假 有 , 
prajñāptisat). We attribute nominal existence to illusions because it facilitates our 
speaking and our thinking. Eventually, illusions are not real insofar as they constantly 
arise and perish. 
However, since we are accustomed to names, we tend to imagine seemingly real 
illusions as permanently real, or, as svabhāva. In Buddhist terms, our imaginations 
pollute illusory dharmas 26 . To purify the pollution, we shall remove the false 
imagination from illusions that are transformed by consciousness. Illusions depend on 
the transforming of consciousness whether we falsely imagine them to be permanent 
or not. Transforming acts thus appear with a double identity: they generate pure 
dharmas that are not polluted by false imagination or they bring about polluted 
dharmas under false imagination27. “Yet, if the real dharmas do not exist, the nominal 
                                                
24 Xuan Zang writes, “both the seeing part and the seen part arise by force of dependent co-arising so 
that both depend on others and that they are seemingly real as consciousness (或識相見等從緣生。俱
依他起虛實如識)” (T31N1585, P59a8). 
25 Xuan Zang writes, “遍計所執都無體故為顯非有假說為名” (T31N1585, P47a10). 
26  In the last section, I will explicate that for later Yogācārins, what causes our suffering from 
attachments is not illusions per se but our wrong perception of illusions.  
27 Suguro Shinjò demarcates this hybridity as the neutrality of the second nature, a neutrality as the 
transparency that can either be tinted with false duality or be as purified from this false duality. 
Moreover, Suguro contends that this hybridity enables the objectification of mind in such a way that 
this objectification facilitates the explication of the pratibhāsa (manifestation) of consciousness 
(Suguro 1985, 152). 
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dharmas do not exist either. It is so because the nominal posited on the basis of the 
real causes”28 (T31N1585, P47c12). Thus, Xuan Zang categorizes the existence of 
transforming acts as real (shi-you, 實有, dravyasat).   
With regard to the underlying consciousnesses that keep transforming, Xuan Zang 
categorizes their existence as real in an absolute sense because their existence “is not 
posited on the basis of other causes and conditions”29 (T31N1585, P47c13). The 
imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) of illusory beings, the other dependent nature 
(paratantrasvabhāva) of transforming acts, and the absolute nature  
(pariniṣpannasvabhāva) of consciousnesses constitute the “three-nature account” 
(san-xing-shuo, 三性說) in the Siddhi.   
In light of the three-nature account, Xuan Zang argues that what we imagine as 
substantial subjects and substantial objects are not svabhāva but seemingly real 
dharmas. These seemingly real dharmas are transformed by consciousness, constantly 
arising and perishing. In this sense, dharmas are empty, not svabhāva. All underlying 
consciousnesses, since they are the origins of transformation, are the truly empty. The 
defining nature of consciousnesses becomes this ‘truly empty’. As Xuan Zang 
explains, “the term ‘only’ [in Consciousness-only] does not deny the dharmas 
dependent of consciousness. That is why truly empty etc. also have their nature” 
(T31N1585，P39a3-4). Thus, “ātman and dharma are not existents. The empty and 
the consciousness are not inexistent”30 (T31N1585,P39b2). As we read in the Siddhi, 
Xuan Zang says later that “the nature of the two empties [empty of ātman and empty 
of dharma] is revealed as tathatā, the suchness” (T31N1585,P46b14). Therefore, 
Xuan Zang has ipso facto referred to the nature of the true empty as emptiness, but 
also, as suchness, as tathatā (zhen-ru, 真如)31.  
Xuan Zang’s affirmation of the nature of the truly empty is further elaborated by 
his disciple Kuiji who differentiates the “empty” (kong, 空) from “emptiness” (kong-
xing, 空性). The empty, in Sanskrit, the śūnya, is “an absence of twofold grasping (qu, 
取, grāha)”. In contrast, emptiness, śūnyatā is the nature of the empty. The Sanskrit 
affix “- tā” denotes the meaning of “-ness” and thus “nature” (T44N1835, P2b25-29). 
This being said, our distinction between grasping subjects and grasped objects is a 
false duality (xu-wang-fen-bie, 虛妄分別, abhūtaparikalpa)32. We will elaborate on 
                                                
28 Xuan Zang writes, “若無實法假法亦無。假依實因而施設故” (T31n1585, P47c12). 
29 Xuan Zang writes, “圓成實性唯是實有。不依他緣而施設故” (T31n1585, P47c13). 
30 Xuan Zang writes, “唯既不遮不離識法。故真空等亦是有性” (T31N158, P39a3-4). That is why “
我法非有空識非” (T31N1585, P39b2). 
31 In the verse “我法非有空識非無”, Vallée Poussin translates «空識 » as « la vacuité et la vijñāna » 
(Vallée Poussin 1928, 424). And as per Vallée Poussin, “la vacuité” is tathatā, the suchness. As we 
read in the Siddhi, “二空所顯真如為性” (T31N1585,P46b14). This suchness pertains to the last of the 
three-nature, the absolute nature, pariniṣpannasvabhāva.  
32 In the commentary of Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāga (bian-zhong-bian-lun, 辯中邊論), Kuiji 
says, “suchness is the underlying nature of false-duality, thus the duality without twofold grasping. But 
we call it śūnya, if it is the absence of the grasping and the grasped. We call it śūnyatā for which śūnya 
opens a door. The disclosed śūnyatā is suchness. In Sanskrit, śūnya is the name of empty; śūnyatā is 
the name of suchness or emptiness. That is why we translate in Chinese the śūnyatā as the nature of 
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false duality in the last section. If we can empty this false duality from consciousness, 
we disclose the nature of truly empty consciousnesses, a nature called emptiness or 
suchness33 . Thus, emptiness is the defining feature of consciousnesses that keep 
transforming, albeit we no longer pose on this transformation any false duality. Due 
to its constant transforming, even truly empty consciousness is not a svabhāva but a 
dynamic flow in constant change as waterfalls and torrents.  
In this articulation of emptiness, Xuan Zang affirms the existence both of 
consciousnesses (i.e. true nature of being empty) and of illusory beings (i.e. the 
nominal existence or seeming reality). Consequently, Xuan Zang bestows on 
emptiness a twofold meaning: first, we realize that illusory dharmas are empty and 
have only nominal existence; then, we remove falsely imagined nature from these 
illusions in order to reveal the nature of being empty, namely, emptiness. This 
realizing and revealing conform to that which Nagao depicts as the “absolute 
emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 216).  
When Xuan Zang translated Indian texts he brought back to China, he also set up 
the standard terminology for Chinese Buddhism. This terminology subtly enriches the 
meaning of Buddhist concepts. In the elaboration of emptiness, Xuan Zang borrows 
several Chinese categories in order to reinforce the twofold meaning of emptiness. He 
translates existence of empty illusions and the nature of consciousness by several 
pairs in Chinese philosophy, such as Yong (用, the functions of the substratum) and Ti 
(體, the underlying substratum), or, Xiang (相, the images determined by the nature) 
and Xing (性, the determinative nature). When Xuan Zang articulates emptiness as the 
Xing or the nature of consciousness, he also translates illusions as the Xiang, the 
images. By translating the Sanskrit term ‘lakṣaṇa’ (the characteristics)34 into ‘Xiang’ 
(image), Xuan Zang reinforces the idea that illusions are not non-existent but we can 
positively refers to them as images due to their nominal existence35.  
                                                                                                                                      
empty (真如是妄分別體故無二取也。但言空者。即二取無。言空性者。以空為門。顯空性即真
如也。梵云瞬若。但名為空。言瞬若多故。說真如名空性也。以多此翻是性義故)”(T44N1835, 
P2b25-29). 
33 Kuiji’s demarcation of the twofold meaning of emptiness can be also inferred from Xuan Zang’s 
explication of ultimate no-nature as suchness in the Siddhi.  
34 It seems that many interpreters of Xuan Zang undervalued Xuan Zang’s creative way of translating. 
This undervaluing can be seen through the translation of ‘Xiang’ (相) in the English version of the 
Siddhi. Vallée Poussin chooses to keep the Sanskrit terms or he translates it into “caractère” (the literal 
meaning of lakṣaṇa) so that he did not pay special attention to the nature-image pair. Cook translates 
‘Xiang’ (相) into ‘form’, in which the relation between nature and image is lost. Cook’s translation can 
be supported by the Chinese translation of the term ‘form” in modern Chinese – modern Chinese 
scholars translate Plato’s theory of form into 相论  (the doctrine of form). However, in western 
philosophy, form is usually paired with matter and in this form-matter pair, it is hard to say which one 
is the determiner – as we see in the debates between realists and nominalists. In contrast, Chinese 
traditional philosophy conceives of nature as the determiner of images. Thus, Cook’s translation of 
‘lakṣaṇa’ shadows the creativity of Xuan Zang’s wording. Some scholars consider Xuan Zang’s 
translation as an important step of sinicizing Indian Buddhism.  
35 Then, Xuan Zang is able to articulate the three-non-nature theory as follows: In virtue of this 
wording, the first imagined nature becomes the appearing or manifesting (pratibhāsa) images of 
consciousness in such a way that these images (lakṣaṇa) are not svabhāvatā (lakṣaṇa niḥsvabhāvatā). 
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Xuan Zang’s vantage point of being affirmative differs from Madhyamaka. Not 
just does illusion have seeming existence; consciousness also has its nature of being. 
We also distinguish later Yogācāra from early Yogācāra by their respective degrees 
of affirming existence. In the Chinese context, Xuan Zang offers an understanding of 
emptiness different from Daśabhūmika and Saṃgraha – emptiness is not the eighth 
consciousness as Daśabhūmika advocates; nor do we need to follow Saṃgraha’s 
postulation of a ninth consciousness. Rather, emptiness is the defining feature of 
unpolluted consciousnesses. 
The next question we will pose on Yogācāra is whether it can solve problems in 
Madhyamaka’s account of emptiness in a more satisfactory way than early Yogācāra. 
Recall the three problems in Madhyamaka’s conception of emptiness: the ambivalent 
nature of the conventional truth, the unknowability of emptiness, and the logical 
infinite regress. For the first problem, Yogācārins formulate the three-nature account 
to accommodate Madhyamaka’s twofold truth. As per Xuan Zang, the conventional 
truth contains three senses: the nominal conventional (jia-shi-su, 假 世 俗 , 
prajñātisaṃvṛti) expressed by the imagined nature, the operational conventional 
(xing-shi-su, 行世俗, pratipattisaṃvṛti) shown by the other dependent nature, and the 
revealing explicit conventional (xian-liao-shi-su, 顯了世俗 , udbhāvanāsaṃvṛti) 
conveyed by the absolute nature (T31N1585, P47b29). Xuan Zang confers the 
conventional truth on all three natures whereas the ultimate truth resides only in the 
absolute nature (T31N1585, P47c4). Now that the conventional truth encompasses the 
nominal existence of illusions and the real empty nature of consciousness, the nature 
of dharmas in the conventional truth is no longer ambivalent. For the second problem, 
since emptiness becomes the nature of consciousness and has its distinct existence, 
emptiness can serve as the object of knowledge. Finally, regarding the last logical 
problem, if ultimate truth resides in the absolute nature, any truth in the higher order 
would be accommodated by the third nature. Hereby, later Yogācārins dissolve the 
infinite regress.        
If we want to realize the truly empty nature of consciousness, we must make 
constant effort to empty false duality. Our making-effort alludes to the importance of 
subjectivity on the epistemic level and of subjective agency on the practical level. 
When we return to this point in the last section, we will see how this affirmation of 
subjectivity in later Yogācāra alludes to the development of Yogācāra’s epistemology 
(Lü 1986, 74).36 After clarifying that emptiness for Xuan Zang is not a pure void but a 
wondrous being, we can continue to examine whether Husserl’s phenomenological 
essence is compatible with Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
A manifestation as such is also not svabhāva (utpatti niḥsvabhāvatā) since images arise because of 
dependent co-arising. The absolute nature of consciousness is also not svabhāva (paramārtha 
niḥsvabhāvatā), because even unpolluted consciousness is constantly transforming itself and the nature 
of these unpolluted consciousnesses qua emptiness is not substantial (T31N1585, P48a11-26) 
36 Fu Xinyi depicts this development as the paradigm shift from early Yogācāra’s philosophy of life 
about suffering and attachment, to later Yogācāra’s epistemology (Fu 2006, 157). I will present this 
change in the last section.  
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3. ESSENCE AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN HUSSERL 
 
For Husserl, phenomenology is the science of essence. By essence, Husserl means 
something that is “accessible to the inquiring”, not a “mystical metaphysical 
essence”, nor a sui generis being (Hua 6/217). In other words, essence is not a 
metaphysical noumenon that transcends our knowledge. Rather, essence is what we 
can know. As I shall argue in this section, for Husserl, essence is the ideal sense.  
Before turning to Husserl’s conception of essence, I would like to, first, clarify 
Husserl’s account of transcendental idealism in which essence is contextualized. In 
the current Husserlian scholarship, we can pinpoint three main readings of Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism: the epistemological reading from David Carr; the 
metaphysical reading from A.D. Smith; and the critical reading from Dan Zahavi.  
First, in the epistemological reading, Carr advocates that Husserl’s transcendental 
idealism is metaphysically neutral, “not part of the metaphysics of the subject” (Carr 
1999, 133). Carr’s main argument is that by means of phenomenological reduction 
called epoché, Husserl has ipso facto suspended the natural existence of the world so 
that for Husserl “it (the transcendental subject) does not determine the world’s being” 
(Carr 1999, 134). Yet, in his later period, Husserl did address many metaphysical 
issues. Regarding these later writings, Carr conjectures that either Husserl is 
pondering upon other ways to develop phenomenology into a rigorous science or 
Husserl is unconsciously denying the scientific feature of phenomenology (Hua 
6/xxxi). By reading transcendental idealism as metaphysically neutral, Carr 
understands this transcendental idealism as a development of Cartesian dualism – 
following Descartes, Husserl closes the transcendental realm off from the empirical 
realm.  
The cost of this dualism, which Carr also finds in Kant, is the paradox of 
subjectivity. It is a paradox because humans can not be both transcendental subjects 
external to experience and empirical objects internal to experience, at the same time 
(Carr 1999, 134). The second or the metaphysical reading is able to resolve this 
paradox. Yet, Carr implicitly accuses this metaphysical reading of pushing “Kant and 
Husserl in the direction of metaphysical idealism” (Carr 1999, 137). By metaphysical 
idealism, Carr means the doctrine for which the real world can be reduced to mental 
phenomena (Carr 1999, 108). This is, exactly, the position of the second reading, 
propounded by A.D. Smith. According to Smith, “for him (Husserl), nothing ‘outside’ 
subjectivity” means that “if consciousness did not exist, nothing would” (Smith 2003, 
179). Smith continues to explain that “nothing outside subjectivity” shows “all 
objective physical objects remain immanent to consciousness” (Smith 2003, 182). 
Because of this immanence, I find Smith’s reading closer to a monism in the Fichtean 
sense.  
Unlike Carr and Smith, Dan Zahavi initiates the third or the critical reading. As 
per Zahavi, Husserl neither absolutely bestows the metaphysical primacy on 
subjectivity (as in Smith’s metaphysical reading) nor completely neutralizes 
metaphysical issues (as in Carr’s epistemological reading) (Zahavi 2010, 75-78). 
Rather, Zahavi interprets Husserl’s idealism as the opponent to metaphysical realism 
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(Zahavi 2010, 85-88). Thus, Zahavi articulates Husserl’s transcendental idealism as 
the “rejection of metaphysical realism” (Zahavi 2010, 85). As we have seen earlier in 
the debates on Nāgārjuna, metaphysical anti-realists refuse to view the world as non-
sensible or mind-independent37.  
Undoubtedly, we do not have to opt for epistemology against metaphysics or vice 
versa. Rather, we locate a spectrum between the epistemological reading and the 
metaphysical reading in Husserl’s conception of transcendental idealism. As Dermot 
Moran interprets, early and late Husserl presented two versions of transcendental 
idealism. In contrast to early Husserl who inclines to be more metaphysically neutral, 
late Husserl tends to revitalize metaphysical idealism (Moran 2012, 227-237). 
Nevertheless, Husserl is a phenomenologist who explicates his position more 
straightforwardly than Mādhyamikas. Therefore, if we leave Husserl at the critical 
reading, it is slightly unfair. On the basis of Zahavi’s demarcation of what Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism is not, I want to positively account for what this idealism is. 
To do so, I begin with an elucidation of Husserl’s conception of existence/being.  
Husserl uses the term existence in two different ways: existence in the naturally 
real sense and existence in the transcendentally phenomenal sense. By natural 
existence, Husserl means the existence of actual reality in the natural spatial-temporal 
order, be it humans, animals, or inorganic bodies. Since we naturally exist in this 
way, as per Husserl, we take this natural existence as “straightforwardly existing” 
(Husserl 1/21). This natural existence will be bracketed or suspended when we enact 
phenomenological reduction called epoché. Afterwards, objects appear by means of 
the second type of existence in our consciousness. Yet, what is this existence? 
According to Husserl, phenomena in consciousness are not passively given to us from 
the outside but are continuously constituted by our subjectivity. Due to this 
constitution, existence of phenomena is not as real as the natural one but remains 
transcendentally ideal. Because of this ideality, we can not always locate phenomenal 
existence, such as the fictional existence, in the natural world. Nevertheless, Husserl 
insists that “natural being is a realm whose existential status is secondary” because “it 
continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (Hua 1/60). By this 
Husserl means that real objects can be meaningfully intended by us only on condition 
that they can appear in our consciousness as phenomena. Since naturally real being 
                                                
37 In a very recent paper, Hilary Putnam intends to differentiate two types of metaphysical realism: 
hardcore metaphysical realism (“as a term for a specific position whose main feature was the insistence 
that the world can be divided into mind-independent objects and properties in exactly one way”) and 
liberal metaphysical realism (for which “representation is a relation between organisms and real things, 
properties and events) (Putnam 2015, 318; 325). Under these two types of metaphysical realism, 
Putnam identifies two kinds of naturalism: the former to scientific naturalism for which truth is 
justified by natural, physical laws whereas the latter to liberal naturalism for which truth can not be 
reduced to causality but is grounded in the possible references (Putnam 2015, 312; 322). Nevertheless, 
Putnam’s differentiation is very new. For Husserl, naturalism is not Putnam’s liberal naturalism but the 
scientific, hardcore naturalism. Mutatis mutandis, when Zahavi and Siderits use the term 
“metaphysical realism”, they mainly refer to Putnam’s hardcore metaphysical realism, not the liberal 
one.    
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presupposes transcendentally phenomenal being, we find the two types of existence 
correlated. They are neither independent nor reducible to one another.  
Consequently, we find Husserl standing in between Carr’s epistemological 
reading and Smith’s metaphysical reading. This being said, Husserl is not entirely 
metaphysically neutral because without out subjectivity, objects cannot be 
meaningfully intended; he distances himself from metaphysical idealism because the 
natural existence of empirical reality is not immanent to consciousness; he also 
disputes metaphysical realism in that subjectivity determines the phenomenal 
existence of objects. Natural existence is not mind-independent insofar as “it (natural 
being) continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (Hua 1/60). Thus, 
it is reasonable for Zahavi to demarcate Husserl as a metaphysical anti-realist. 
After elucidating what Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not, I proceed to 
outlining what it is. I consider Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a correlative 
dualism that is much weaker than the Cartesian one. I will come back to this contrast 
between Husserl and Descartes further on. Now, to be more specific, I pinpoint three 
defining features of Husserl transcendental idealism: (1) Husserl neither negates the 
empirical reality of objects nor advocates that all physical beings are immanent in 
consciousness; (2) by affirming the natural existence that is psycho-physical, Husserl 
tries to warn us of the danger of seeing only natural existence and of forgetting the 
phenomenal existence; (3) the antidote to this forgetting is epoché by which we enter 
the transcendental realm and connect ourselves to the world. By virtue of this 
subjectivity, we constitute the transcendental realm on the condition of which the 
psycho-physical world can correlate to our consciousness and can appear as mental 
phenomena for us. This correlation makes the world meaningful to us. Once we attain 
this meaningful life, we liberate ourselves from the natural attitude. This liberation 
thus alludes to the way in which transcendental idealism “enlightens” us (Moran 
2012, 241).  
Now, let me clarify the point earlier that Husserl’s transcendental idealism is a 
much weaker dualism than that in Descartes. The standard reading of Cartesian 
dualism is that through his meditations, Descartes closes subjective mind off from the 
objective world. However, we do not find the same closing-off in Husserl. By 
rejecting both metaphysical idealism and realism, Husserl considers transcendental 
ideality and empirical reality as two interdependent facets of the same life. For 
Husserl, our mind, the subjective mind is not Ryle’s “ghost in the machine” or a mad 
doctor’s “brain in a vat” but metaphysically open to objective reality.38 Because of 
                                                
38 Unlike Carr who claims that Husserl is reaffirming the Cartesian dualism, I think Husserl follows 
Descartes but goes beyond him. Let us recall Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. In this lecture, Husserl 
keeps stressing that we need a “transformation of the old-Cartesian meditations” and a “new 
beginning” (Hua 1/49-50). Thus, Husserl intends to depart from Descartes, not merely following him. 
As Iso Kern identifies, Cartesian meditation is just one of the three ways for Husserl to begin the 
phenomenological reduction (Kern 1964, 196). In this regard, David W. Smith dubs Husserl’s idealism 
“dependent idealism” or “transcendental relativism” to gloss the relative sense of Husserl’s ontological 
and metaphysical position (David W. Smith 2007, 168-181). I think my use of dualism is closer to 
David W. Smith’s demarcation.  
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this openness, Husserl’s transcendental idealism goes beyond the Cartesian dualism. 
Like Moran portrays, each ego lives a “double life”39: we live in the real psycho-
physical world that is intersubjectively accessible but we also live in a world where 
subjectivity (or intersubjectivity) functions as the condition for all possible experience 
and as the determiner of the sense of the natural reality for us.   
In his Buddhist Phenomenology, Lusthaus highlights that Yogācāra is a 
transcendental idealism in the Husserlian sense, not in the Kantian sense. Instead of 
elaborating on this demarcation, Lusthaus only asserts that Husserl’s transcendental 
idealism differs from Kant’s insofar as Husserl does not postulate the split between 
phenomenon and noumenon (Lusthaus 2003, vii-viii). However, as Philipp Berghofer 
argues, whether we can juxtapose Kant and Husserl as polar opposites largely 
depends on the way in which we interpret the two philosophers (Berghofer 2015, 
155). If we follow the standard reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
championed by P.F. Strawson and H.A. Prichard that Kant separates the 
transcendental realm from the empirical realm, we find Husserl radically different 
from Kant. However, if we do not follow this two-world reading but opt for Henry 
Allison’s one-world reading that the transcendental and the empirical are two sides of 
one same world40, we suddenly realize that Kant’s transcendental idealism is quite 
close to Husserl’s (Crowell 2001, 236). I contend, therefore, that we can keep open 
the meta-epistemological question whether Husserl articulates transcendental 
idealism differently from Kant. Yet, we will never question the disagreements 
between Kant and Husserl on their cognitive architectonics – in their epistemology, 
Kant stresses more conceptuality because intuition must be unified by understanding 
before being represented to mind whereas Husserl prioritizes intuitions in that any 
meaningful concepts find their ground in intuitions (KrV A99, B143; Hua 19/699).   
Now that we have elucidated Husserl’s conception of idealism, we can proceed to 
clarifying his idea of essence which will enable us to justify the compatibility 
between the Husserlian essence and the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. In his pre-
transcendental period, Husserl uses the term essence to attack psychologism. Husserl 
introduces the concept of “essence” in Logical Investigations, when inquiring into the 
identity of various mental presentations of the same given object – how do we know 
that we perceive the same object even when our perception of that object varies from 
time to time and from place to place? Psychologists such as Brentano attribute this 
cognitive identity to “empirical contingencies of the course of consciousness”, that is, 
to real psychological activities (Hua 19/704). However, Husserl argues that 
                                                
39 Moran writes, “human beings are physical, corporeal objects in physical, corporeal world” but “the 
world has ‘being and sense’ not because of this physicality, but precisely because of the achievements 
of the transcendental ego and indeed the open-ended plurality of transcendental egos acting in consort” 
(Moran 2012, 239) 
40  Allison advocates that transcendental idealism prescribes the universal condition for human 
knowledge whereas empirical realism affirms real inter-subjectively accessible objects in spatio-
temporal order. In contrast, transcendental realism postulates the existence of non-sensible noumena in 
itself, and empirical idealism, similar to psychologism, equates ideality with private data of the 
individual mind (Allison 1983, 6-7). We can find textual support in the “Fourth Paralogism of Ideality” 
for Allison’s one-world reading (KrV A369-370). 
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sometimes, the object of knowledge does not have real, empirical existence. 
Examples of these objects are fictional beings, such as unicorn or vampire, or those in 
our memory. Considering these counterexamples, Husserl advocates that identical 
knowing should be guaranteed by ‘intentional and epistemic essence” (Hua 19/704). 
By essence, Husserl means the underlying identical sense (intuitively as that of “what 
object it is meant”) or meaning (conceptually as that of “in what sense it is meant”) of 
mental presentations in our consciousness (Hua 19/499). If essence amounts to the 
identical sense or meaning, it always entails more than what is really in front of us, 
more than what we can really observe or recorde. Due to this ‘more than’, we can 
never reduce essence to psychological activities.  
After clarifying the condition of identical knowing, Husserl proceeds to 
investigating conditions of knowledge in general. Clearly, what make our knowledge 
possible can not be psychological laws. Otherwise, we would not be able to envisage 
fictional objects. Then, where does our knowledge come from if knowledge is not 
issued by laws abstracted from mental activities? According to Husserl, these laws 
are those that confer senses on real objects. Husserl considers these laws to be purely 
logical, not psychological, because they present “us [with] not what is generally wont 
to be in this or that province of the real, but what absolutely goes beyond all wont and 
all divisions into spheres of reality” (Hua 19/704). By saying this, Husserl implies 
that pure logical laws are not real – they are ideal. Since the ideal gives sense to the 
real, pure logical laws become the ground for psychological laws (Hua 19/705).  
Husserl, in his pre-transcendental period, focuses more on critiquing 
psychologism. He does not clarify the antidote to psychologism, although he implies 
it by contrasting the psychological/real with the pure/ideal. After his transcendental 
turn, Husserl makes explicit this antidote qua transcendental idealism. Therefore, it is 
fair to say that Husserl’s reflection on psychologism gradually nourishes the mature 
form of transcendental phenomenology.  
This transcendental turn, as is mentioned in the introduction, is marked by the 
release of his Ideas1 in which Husserl contests not just psychologism but also 
naturalism. What characterizes naturalism is the way in which it presupposes the 
world to be pregiven and mind-independent. The naturalistic worldview gives rise to 
modern physicalism. For physicalism, the world is a mind-independent thing-in-itself 
that runs under physical laws. Husserl describes that physicalism views object as 
“individual object as such, a ‘This here’, an object never repeatable; as qualitied ‘in 
itself’” (Hua 3/13). Since the world is mind-independent, we can never be sure about 
our perception of external objects. What we are able to know is merely 
representations inside our mind. In this way, our knowledge becomes the product of 
psychological activities. This view of knowledge conforms to that which we 
mentioned earlier—psychologism. For psychologism, any knowable object is merely 
“something real individually” that exists as the “experienceable, real actuality” (Hua 
3/13, 3/40). Psychologism and physicalism become two correlated sides of the same 
coin qua naturalism. 
Husserl finds this naturalistic worldview rather dangerous because under this 
worldview, we take the mind and the world as pre-given without even being able to 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016)  LI 
79 
question this pregiven-ness. Due to this inability, Husserl portrays humans in the 
natural attitude as “naïve” (Hua 3/79). For Husserl, if we naively assume the world as 
such to be a pre-given mechanism under natural laws, we lose our connection to the 
world. Subsequently, we also lose the chance of attaining the genuine meaning of life, 
because natural laws grant us “merely ‘empirical’ meaning, the meaning of a mere 
‘matter of fact’” (Hua 19/706). Mutatis mutandis, in Husserl’s terms, “a relation [as 
the psychological law] to our mental organization, or to consciousness in general 
(understood as the aspects of consciousness common to men in general), does not 
define the pure and the genuine” (Hua 19/706). If we degrade mental activities to the 
automatic generation of psychological laws, we miss the genuine meaning of 
consciousness. 
What defines “the pure and the genuine” is the science of essence, namely, 
phenomenology. Phenomenology never stops at matter of facts. Nor does it oppose 
itself to factual sciences. Rather, phenomenology lays the ground for factual sciences 
because any naturally exiting fact presupposes the essential phenomenological 
existence. As Husserl says, “everything belonging to the essence of the individuum, 
another individuum can have too” (Hua 3/14). Underlying these real matters, essence 
is the eidetically universal which “delimits ‘regions’ or ‘categories’ of individua (Hua 
3/14). By eidetic universality, Husserl means that essence is that which we can intuit 
universally from phenomena given in consciousness. “Essence is a new sort of 
object… the datum of eidetic intuition” (Hua 3/ 16). Here, we must notice Husserl’s 
stress of constitutive subjectivity – essence is not passively given in intuition; rather, 
essence is that which we put into an idea after we find in the given “that is proper to 
an individual itself as its what” (Hua 3/14). Essence, therefore, is the “ideation” of 
contingent matters of facts – it is the ideal sense that we find universal to the real 
senses of matters of facts or, in short, universal to “matters-of-fact-ness” (Hua 3/13).  
I want to explicate the relation between essence and transcendental idealism by 
referring back to epoché. As is mentioned earlier, Husserl devises epoché as the 
antidote to the natural attitude. Epoché puts three things into brackets: first, the 
natural world; second, “judgments about the spatio-temporal beings”; third, “all the 
sciences relating to [the] natural world” (Hua 3/65). Before epoché, things exist in the 
psycho-physical natural order. “Nothing else but the natural world is seen” (Hua 
3/68). Through epoché, we suspend the natural existence of the world. Subsequently, 
we also neutralize our judgments about the natural world. Thus, after epoché, we 
make the world an intelligible phenomenon for us (Hua 3/68). In the process of 
enacting epoché, we dwell back to our pure consciousness, in which objects appear as 
our mental phenomena (Hua 3/188). When we perceive these phenomena, our 
intuition reaches out to the world and makes the world an intelligible field. Every 
time the subject fixes eyes on an object, the intelligible field changes accordingly in 
order to make the intended object stand out. Through intuition, we build up 
intentionality between the intentional object or the noema and the intending, noetic 
act. Objectivity for Husserl, consequently, is not mind-independent. Instead, 
objectivity in pure consciousness is always ensured by subjective intuitive acts. The 
intuitive intelligible sense of objects becomes the ground for valid concepts or 
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meaning-intentions41. The essence for Husserl is the intelligible sense or the ideal 
meaning of intentional objects that appear after epoché.  
Here, we summarize four features of Husserl’s conception of essence: first, 
essence is not a mind-independent substance; second, it is constituted by intuitive acts 
in the process of perception; third, essence is the ideal sense issued by subjectivity; 
fourth, essence guarantees objectivity of knowledge. Because of these four features, 
we can also say that essence is the product of transcendental idealism. 
Phenomenology as the science of essence, therefore, is ipso facto the phenomenology 
as transcendental idealism.   
Husserl’s break-through in Ideas1 marks the advent of his transcendental 
phenomenology. He keeps expending the limit of transcendental idealism and 
consequently, the limit of essence. In the Inner Time Consciousness, Husserl replaces 
the twofold noesis-noema structure with the threefold ego-cogito-cogitatum (Hua 
1/87). This solipsist schema further becomes intersubjective when Husserl continues 
to inquire into a “higher value-form of humanity” (Hua 27/54). These inquiries are 
exemplified by his analysis of socio-historical groups such as cultural communities in 
the Kaizo articles as well as his investigation of the transcultural life-world in the 
Crisis. Transcendental ideality for Husserl is no longer just about ‘me’ as the subject, 
but also about ‘we’ as collective subjects. Consequently, Husserl renders multi-
dimensional the objectivity42. Since Husserl expands the dimension of subjectivity 
and objectivity, he also makes essence multi-dimensional. This being said, essence is 
not just that of individual perception (what perception means for me), but also that of 
individual temporality in life (what my life means for me), that of communal groups 
(what our communities mean for us), and finally that of all humans (what history and 
the world mean for humans) (Hua 6/100, 193; Hua 27/ 44).  
To close my analysis in this section, I would like to return to the problem of 
essence. Given the four features of the Husserlian essence (mind-dependence; 
constructability; ideality; objectivity), I examine now whether Xuan Zang’s account 
of emptiness can countenance Husserl’s conception of essence. Recall the conception 
of emptiness in Xuan Zang. As I have clarified in the previous section, emptiness has 
a twofold meaning: realizing that illusory beings have only nominal existence, empty 
of permanent existence; removing false duality from illusions so as to reveal the truly 
empty nature of consciousnesses. This being said, Buddhist practitioners shall stop 
seeing the self and the world as substances, ceasing to view the relation between the 
self and the world as that between graspers and the grasped. If they succeed in doing 
so, they remove falsely imagined nature from illusions. Consequently, they see 
                                                
41  Husserl’s conception of intuition differs strongly from Kant’s. This also marks the divergence 
between Husserl’s pure phenomenology and Kant’s critical philosophy – for Kant, what is universal 
can only be grasped by concepts, not by intuitive acts, and concepts are already pre-made categories; 
mutatis mutandis, for Kant, objectivity is guaranteed by transcendental laws in understanding, not by 
that in intuition.  
42 As Gurwitsch remarks, Husserl’s account of objectivity is multi-dimensional: from objectivity of 
individual perception, to that of socio-historical groups, and finally to that of the trans-socio-historical 
Lebenswelt (Gurwitsch 1966, 168). 
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illusory dharmas as they really are, as constantly being transformed from 
consciousness, as continuous arising and perishing. In the conclusion, I will elaborate 
further on the way in which later Yogācārins articulate emptiness as the way of curing 
sufferings. Given this account of emptiness in later Yogācāra, we can see that essence 
in the Husserlian sense is compatible with Yogācāra’s conception of emptiness, 
because (1) essence per se is not a substantial being nor a svabhāva; (2) essence never 
presupposes the substantial existence of subjects, objects, and their relation, because 
all three are constituted by flowing consciousness; (3) essence shows the ideal sense 
of objects that we obtain immediately in intuition so that essence ensures the 
authentic knowing of objects as they are. All these three meanings of essence 
conform to Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness. More importantly, essence 
demonstrates the way in which objectivity is grounded in transcendental subjectivity. 
This role of subjectivity in Husserl is also endorsed by Yogācāra – detaching false 
views and acquiring correct views call for subject’s effort.  
Now that Yogācāra’s account of emptiness countenances the Husserlian essence, 
this result allows us to formulate a Buddhist phenomenology both on the 
epistemological level and on the meta-epistemological level.  
 
4. CONCLUSION: XUAN ZANG’S BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
At the end of Section two, I mention the development of epistemology that further 
intensified the divide between early Yogācāra and later Yogācāra. To conclude my 
paper, I would like to contextualize this epistemological turn in theories of 
consciousness offered by Yogācārins. By examining these theories, I intend to 
articulate the way in which later Yogācāra’s account of consciousness can be 
interpreted as a transcendental phenomenology in the Husserlian sense.  
As is demonstrated in the introduction, Xuan Zang defines consciousness as 
vijñāpti – the act for someone to know something distinctly. In Husserlian terms, 
consciousness for Yogācārins amounts to the intentional relation between subjective 
acts and objects to be known. Unlike early Yogācārins, Xuan Zang does not 
differentiate the original consciousness from others. Due to this non-differentiation, 
when Xuan Zang uses the term consciousness, he means all eight consciousnesses 
and their accompanied mental factors 43  (T31N1585, P1a29). The way in which 
consciousness enables someone to distinctly know something is called the 
                                                
43 Xuan Zang writes, “all manifesting images are transformed by consciousness so that their existences 
are postulated. Consciousness means vijñāpti [namely, causing someone to distinctly know 
something]. This consciousness mentioned here also encompasses the accompanied mental factors 
(caitta) because these mental factors are always associated with corresponding consciousnesses (彼相
皆依識所轉變而假施設。識謂了別。此中識言，亦攝心所，定相應故)” (T31N1585, P1a29). In 
Yogācāra, the eight consciousnesses are these: first five consciousnesses pertaining to eyes, ears, nose, 
tongue and body, the sixth consciousness is mind, the seventh is kleśavijñāna or manas (the delusional 
self-consciousness), and the eighth is the ālayavijñāna (the warehouse consciousness). When each 
consciousness transforms into various images, several mental factors begin to function at the same 
time.  
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“transformation of consciousness” (識轉變, vijñānapariṇāma). Yogācārins clarify this 
transformation through the structure of consciousness. They formulate the structure in 
four ways, three recorded by Xuan Zang in the Siddhi and the other supplemented by 
Kuiji. While early Yogācārins provide the first two structures, the last two are offered 
by later Yogācārins. 
Each of these formulations conveys its distinct epistemological and meta-
epistemological implications. The first account of the structure of consciousness 
comes from Sthiramati, defined by Kuiji as the “onefold structure (yi-fen-shuo, 一分
說)” (T43N1830, P242a25). By onefoldness, Kuiji means that Sthiramati articulates 
consciousness as svasaṃvitti (zi-zheng, 自證), namely, self-consciousness. Although 
Xuan Zang does not mention the onefold structure in the Siddhi, he implies it in one 
understanding of Consciousness-only—“some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga), 
etc. have consciousness as their nature because consciousness transforms itself by 
force of perfuming as if consciousness encompassed these parts” (T31N1585, 
P59a15). From these descriptions, we can infer that for Sthiramati, consciousness is 
the process of self-transforming into illusions. Due to this transformation, illusions, 
though seeming to be encompassed by consciousness, are empty. Since illusions have 
consciousness as their nature, if illusions are empty, so is consciousness. Therefore, 
Sthiramati conceives of emptiness as nullifying illusions.  
In the second twofold structure (er-fen-shuo, 二分說 ), Nanda dichotomizes 
consciousness into two parts, the act of knowing called darśanabhāga (the seeing part 
qua subject) and the objects to be known called nimittabhāga (the seen part qua 
object) 44. Xuan Zang explicates that for Nanda, “the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc. 
are transformed by consciousness but these transformations are not as real as 
consciousness” (T31N1585, P59a6-7). Nanda’s conception of Consciousness-only is 
supported by the Sūtrālamkāra, in which the grasping act (grāhaka) and the grasped 
object (grāhya) are compared to the illusory light of the citta/consciousness 
(T31n1604, P613b12). As we have mentioned in section two, if both grāhaka and 
grāhya are illusions transformed by consciousness, illusions have consciousness as 
their nature. Since illusions are empty, so is consciousness.   
On the meta-epistemological level, both the onefold model and the twofold model 
contend that all dharmas, be it the act of transforming or transformed objects, are 
illusions originated from consciousness. As long as consciousnesses transform into 
illusory images, we falsely dichotomize consciousnesses into svabhāvic subjects and 
objects to which we attach (T31N1585, P45c22-25). For early Yogācārins, we suffer 
from attachments because we are under illusions. If we want to cure suffering by 
realizing emptiness, we shall dispel illusions from the original consciousness. Let me 
                                                
44  Xuan Zang introduces Nanda’s account later in the elaboration of ālaya, “yet, the impure 
consciousness, when it is born as the underlying substratum, it seems to appear as subjects and objects. 
It is the same for mental factors that accompany consciousness. What seems to be the object is called 
nimittabhāga，the seen part or the image part (of consciousness). What seems to be the subject is 
called darśanabhāga, the seeing part (of consciousness) (然有漏識自體生時。皆似所緣能緣相現。
彼相應法應知亦爾。似所緣相說名相分。似能緣相說名見分)” (T31N1585, P10a22-24).  
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translate this view into western philosophical terms: all things are relative because 
they are originated from consciousness and shall be reduced to consciousness. Early 
Yogācārins, then, have in fact endorsed ontological monism45 (only consciousness 
really exists) and metaphysical idealism (nothing exists outside consciousness).  
Unlike early Yogācārins, Dignāga puts forward the threefold structure (san-fen-
shuo, 三分說 ) – consciousness constantly flows as the underlying process qua 
svasaṃvittibhāga which transforms to the seeing act qua darśanabhāga and the seen 
object qua nimittabhāga. Therefore, for Dignāga, consciousness as the process of 
transformation differs from the transforming act and the transformed object.  
In the Siddhi, Xuan Zang contrasts the threefold structure of consciousness in 
Yogācāra with that in Sarvāstivāda. As we have introduced in section two, 
Sarvāstivādins embrace Ābhidharmic realism and view the world as mind-
independent. In their threefold structure, Sarvāstivādins “refer to external objects as 
ālambana (suo-yuan, 所缘 , the object of knowledge); to nimitta-bhāga as ākāra 
(xing-xiang,行相, function); to darśanabhāga as underlying dravya (shi, 事, events) 
[of receiving external objects], because darśanabhāga is the nature of consciousness 
and its mental factors”46 (T31N1585, P10b2-3). Thus, when consciousness enacts its 
ākāra of representing, external objects as ālambana are directly given to us. The 
existence of these external objects does not depend on our consciousness.  
I find this cognitive architectonic in Sarvāstivāda rather similar to that in 
naturalism. For Husserl, naturalism renders the external world independent of our 
consciousness. Naturalists account for cognition as reception of external objects in 
our mind. However, Dignāga identifies one problem in Sarvāstivāda’s threefold 
structure. If cognizing means to receive external objects, how can we account for 
memories? In memory, the objects of recollecting do not exist at present but this 
“absence for now” never hinders us from recollecting these objects (T31N1585, 
P10b8-9). If we recall Husserl’s attack of naturalism, we can see that Husserl’s 
argument is similar to Dignāga’s. Sometimes, although the objects of our knowledge 
do not have natural existence, we can still perceive them.  
Xuan Zang is thus confident that once people understand the truth of 
Consciousness-only, they will turn to Yogācāra’s threefold structure –“[Yogācārins] 
refer to the seen image (nimittabhāga) as the ālambana; to the seeing act 
(darśanabhāga) as the ākāra; to the underlying process of nimittabhāga and 
darśanabhāga as the event, namely, svasaṃvittibhāga”47 (T31N1585, P10b6-7). Now 
that consciousnesses flow like “torrents and waterfalls”, they constantly transform 
into their own objects and the acts of knowing (T31N1585, P7c19). Here, we can 
                                                
45  Readers might already notice that in early Yogācāra’s articulation, the original consciousness 
becomes an absolute reality. Paramārtha refers to this reality as the Tathāgatagarbha. Further on, the 
Huayan school develops the conception of Tathāgatagarbha whereas many Chan clergy accuse this 
conception of substantializing emptiness and thus of violating Buddha’s teaching of emptiness.  
46 Xuan Zang writes, “執有離識所緣境者。彼說外境是所緣。相分名行相。見分名事。是心心所
自體相故” (T31N1585, P10b2-3). 
47 Xuan Zang writes, “達無離識所緣境者。則說相分是所緣。見分名行相。相見所依自體名事。
即自證分” (T31N1585, P10b6-7). 
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pinpoint the major difference between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, that is, their 
conceptions of ālambana, of the object of knowledge. Unlike Sarvāstivādins who 
considers ālambana to be external real objects, Xuan Zang conceives of ālambana as 
nimittabhāga, as images transformed by consciousness. While Sarvāstivādin’s 
cognitive architectonic resembles that in naturalism, Dignāga’s threefold structure 
resembles Husserl’s ego-cogito-cogitatum 
However, Dignāga’s threefold model of consciousness is vulnerable to one 
problem – if self-consciousness qua svasaṃvitti is the ground for the seeing part and 
the seen part, what will be the ground for this self-consciousness? Without an answer, 
we might again fall into infinite regress – we can always locate a more fundamental 
ground for consciousness so on ad infinitum. Without such a ground, how can we be 
sure that we are conscious of our self-consciousness? Thus, as Xuan Zang explains, 
consciousness must have one more part to justify the existence of self-consciousness, 
through which we can be certain of our self-consciousness (T31N1585, P10b18-22). 
This fourth part is called the “awareness of self-consciousness” or the 
svasaṃvittisaṃvittibhāga (zheng-zi-zheng-fen, 證自證分). Since svasaṃvittisaṃvittt is 
svasaṃvitti’s immediate intuitive awareness of itself, svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti and 
svasaṃvitti have the same nature. By supplementing svasaṃvittisaṃvitti, Dharmapāla 
advocates the fourfold structure (si-fen-shuo, 四分說) – the seeing part, the seen part, 
self-consciousness, and the immediate awareness of self-consciousness.  
In light of their articulation of consciousness, Dignāga and Dharmapāla also 
provide a distinctive interpretation of false duality. This interpretation begins with the 
elucidation of attachments. As is mentioned earlier, in early Yogācāra, we suffer from 
attachments because we are under illusions. However, for later Yogācārins, illusions 
per se are not the cause of sufferings. Dharmas are illusory whose existence is 
seemingly real. This being said, dharmas, be it human mind or the external world in 
western terms, constantly arise and perish. This is how dharmas are – constantly 
changing, impermanent, and empty. These illusory dharmas are not directly of false 
duality. As per Xuan Zang, false duality is generated not by all consciousnesses but 
only by the sixth consciousness called the mind and the seventh consciousness called 
the manas. Through the mind, we conceptualize the world to be substantial whereas 
through the manas, we mistake the eighth consciousness for the unchanging 
svabhāvic self (T31N1585, P45c26). Later Yogācārins further elaborate on their 
account of false duality in the theory of pramāṇa48.  
                                                
48 As the theory of pramāṇa is beyond the main focus of this paper, I would provide a brief sketch of 
this theory. In each moment, consciousness generates the transforming act which then constitutes its 
distinct object. If transformed objects have seeming reality in only the current moment and this 
seeming reality soon vanishes in the next moment, authentic knowledge is momentarily gained through 
intuition. This portrait of intuitive knowing (pratyakṣapramāṇa) in Dignāga resembles Husserl’s 
account of intuition – intuition is the ground for intentionality and is the authentic thinking (Hua 
12/193). All eight consciousnesses and their mental factors can generate their distinct intuitive 
knowledge of their respective objects from one moment to another. That is why Consciousness-only 
for later Yogācāra is not about one original consciousness but about all consciousnesses (T31N1585, 
P39c21). On the basis of intuition, humans always tend to extract concepts from intuitive knowing. 
Concepts render the identity of all things stabilized. By conceptual thinking (anumānapramāṇa), we 
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Through this interpretation of false duality, we can see that for Xuan Zang, we 
suffer from attachments because we falsely conceptualize illusory dharmas into 
substances, not because consciousness transforms itself into illusory dharmas. 
Emptiness thus does not negate consciousness and its transformations. Rather, we 
realize emptiness as the nature of flowing consciousness after we understand the error 
of conceptualizing. In this way, for later Yogācārins, realizing emptiness becomes an 
epistemological question of seeing things as they are without false duality, not a 
metaphysical question of negating duality. This change becomes what I refer to 
earlier as the epistemological turn of Yogācāra. After the epistemological turn, later 
Yogācārins articulate subjectivity as the condition that bestows sense on nominal 
existence and that guarantees objective knowing of illusions.   
Meta-epistemologically, since later Yogācārins dispute any mind-independent 
reality, they do not embrace metaphysical realism as Sarvāstivādins. Neither do they 
endorse metaphysical idealism as early Yogācārins in that later Yogācārins object to 
reducing the existence of illusory dharmas back to consciousness. Rather, we find that 
later Yogācārins affirm the nominal existence of illusions insofar as this shows how 
dharmas really are in empirical life. This objectivity of illusory dharmas is ensured by 
subjectivity that serves as the condition of the meaning of nominal existence. For later 
Yogcarins, seeming reality of illusions and transcendental subjectivity of 
consciousness are also two sides of the same life. In this life, we realize emptiness by 
cultivating genuine knowledge of how dharmas genuinely are and by dispelling false 
duality. Thus, we lay the foundation for Xuan Zang’s Buddhist phenomenology that 
epistemologically articulates the intentional structure of consciousness and meta-
epistemologically entails transcendental idealism.  
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